Scientific Knowledge
The nature, structure, and justification of scientific knowledge have been topics of central importance for most of the twentieth century.  While it is still not clear that there is complete consensus on the criteria for scientific knowledge, nor should there be since science is an evolving activity, several key features have emerged from the discussion. These have grown out of a reassessment of criteria initially proposed for scientific knowledge in the course of the Scientific Revolution, when the kind of knowledge the New Science was proposed to deliver was alleged to differ fundamentally in kind from what had been previously accepted as knowledge - Aristotelian in character, proceeding from esoteric definitions of fundamental concept. From the New Science tradition, there are several treasured characteristics of scientific knowledge that recent discussions have forced us to abandon or significantly modify.  Given the New Science's emphasis on the role of mathematics, scientific knowledge was described as "universal," "true," and "certain."  As the special features of the different sciences – most notably the social sciences – became more pronounced, however, the universality claim had to be modified and carefully bracketed.  In the social sciences the development of social relativism made this inevitable.  Scientific claims to "truth" and "certainty" suffered a similar fate.  But in these cases the problems were not due to specific aspects of the individual sciences.  Rather, they resulted from the difficulty of demonstrating the truth of scientific claims in a non question- begging manner – on the one hand – and – on the other hand – from the recognition of the fundamentally underdetermined nature of the relation between any scientific claim and its evidence.
Given emendations formulated in light of criticism, which arose in response to these newly reconstituted problems traditional account offers some features that remain viable.  For example, it characterizes scientific knowledge as produced by researchers exploring the domain of a theory who aim to provide an account of the relations among the objects and processes of that domain, an account which provides the basis for an explanation of phenomena generally observed or detected in another domain.  If I were tempted to isolate one crucial characteristic of scientific knowledge, it would be this: Scientific claims derive their meaning from the theories within which they are associated; hence, scientific knowledge is theory-bound
      The theory-bound nature of scientific knowledge presents additional problems beyond those noted above for some traditional assumptions about scientific knowledge – in particular the view that scientific knowledge, if true, is true for all time. If scientific knowledge is theory-bound, and if – as we know from the history of science – theories change, then scientific knowledge changes. Hence, what is accepted as scientific knowledge is not true for all time, at least not all of it, not yet.  But this should not be a startling claim.  The development of human knowledge is a process of continuous exploration in which we re- evaluate what we know in the course of new findings, and we jettison that which no longer remains consistent with the latest body of information.
We should note further that the tentative nature of scientific knowledge does not mean that knowledge is merely relative – especially in any sense that gives comfort to those opposed to the epistemic priority we traditionally give to scientific claims. The dynamic process in which scientists continuously revise what they are willing to endorse – and by which they examine their assumptions and their methods – is at the very heart of the strength of the sciences.  Thus, despite the theory-bound nature of scientific knowledge, the self-critical process of scientific inquiry insures that the knowledge it claims is the best available at that time insofar as it is judged "best" according to community standards. 机械设计制造及其自动化英文参考文献和翻译(2):http://www.751com.cn/fanyi/lunwen_366.html